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Conventional wisdom states that large banks
are safer than small banks because they can
diversify more. This conventional wisdom,
however, confuses risk with probability of fail-
ure. While thelaw of large numbers does imply
that a large bank is less likely to fail than a
small bank, equating this tendency with lower
risk falls into what Samuelson [1963] termed the
fallacy of large numbers. A $10 billion bank
may be less likely to fail than a $10 million
bank, but it may also saddle the investor with 
a $10 billion loss. 
In this article, I hope to clarify what this dis-
tinction means for banks. Banks diversify by
growing—by adding risks—something dis-
tinctly different from the subdivision of risk be-
hind standard portfolio theory. A simple mean-
variance example will make the point that a
risk-averse bank owner need not value diversifi-
cation by addition. After that, I take a regulator’s
perspective and consider how a bank guarantee
fund, such as the deposit insurance agency,
views bank growth and diversification. After a
short review of why diversification by adding
risks decreases the probability of bank failure, 
I look at how such diversification alters the
expected value of deposit insurance agency
payments, then turn to diversification’s impact
on the deposit insurance agency’s expected
utility, using recent results from the theory of
standard risk aversion. 
To concentrate on the cleanest example, this
article stays with the case of independent and
identically distributed risks. This admittedly
ignores the alleged ability of large banks to
diversify regionally1 or the possibly adverse
incentives of deposit insurance (Boyd and
Runkle [1993], Todd and Thomson [1991]).
I. A Simple Example
Probably the easiest way to understand the
effects of diversification by adding risks is to
consider a bank financed exclusively by an
owner/investor who cares only about means
and variances. With no debt, failure ceases to
be an issue; instead, the question is the utility-
maximizing portfolio for the bank’s owner.
n 1 Compare Haubrich (1990) with Kryzanowski and Roberts (1993).
Even small banks may diversify, however, by selling loans or participating
in mortgage pools or other forms of securitization.
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veniently for us, sunk his entire wealth W into
the bank. He faces the problem of dividing his
portfolio between holding S safe government
bonds with a certain return of zero and invest-
ing in some number K of risky, independent
bank loans with returns Ri normally distributed
as N (m,s 2), that is, with mean m and variance
s 2. If each loan costs a dollar, the investor’s
budget constraint is W = S +K. These bank
loans are indivisible—the bank cannot diver-
sify by spreading one dollar across many loans.
Then the return on the portfolio is 
.
Since  is distributed N(Km, Ks 2), the 
portfolio has expected return E (R ~p) =    m
and variance s 2(R ~p) =  s 2. From this, simple
substitution (for this and other standard tech-
niques, see Fama and Miller [1972], chapter 6,
section IV) implies that
(1) E(R ~p) =    
In mean-standard deviation space, equation
(1) defines a portfolio opportunity set, or the
different risk and return combinations available
to the investor. This set is illustrated by figure 1
(for W = 5, m = 1, and s = 1). The opportunity
set is disjointed, since the decision to add
another loan is discrete. Depending on the
shape of the indifference curves, the bank
owner may choose to put none, all, or some of
3
his wealth into bank loans. Figure 1 shows a
typical case with an interior solution, illustrating
quite clearly that the bank does not always wish
to diversify. Stated another way, the portfolio
return is distributed N( m, s 2), so that
as the bank invests in more loans, the standard
deviation increases as well as the expected
return. Preferences determine which of them
matters more. 
An all-equity bank offers a nice illustration,
but does not provide a very representative case.





Allowing banks to take in deposits means
allowing banks to fail. The return on assets may
not cover the payments promised to depositors.
Many countries provide some sort of deposit
insurance, which guarantees the deposit. In the
case where bank assets cannot cover the pay-
ments promised to depositors, the difference
becomes a liability for the deposit insurance
agency (which may be either public or private).
This provides a natural focal point for our dis-
cussion, although what happens in reality is
much more complicated. Actual banks raise
money in many different ways, using several
types of preferred stock, subordinated bonds,
commercial paper, and both insured and unin-
sured deposits. What happens in bankruptcy is
at best complicated and at worst unknown,
because the courts must determine the validity
of claims as diverse as offsetting deposits and
the source-of-strength doctrine. A detailed con-
sideration of how each class of investors views
diversification, then, is beyond the scope of this
article. Instead, to make what is admittedly a
simple point, I concentrate on the deposit
insurance agency, which ultimately bears the
liability for bank failures.
The deposit insurance agency steps in if the
realization of bank assets Y is too low to repay
the face value of the debt F, that is, if Y < F.
This is a fairly general formulation in that the
assets producing Y may be funded by means
other than deposits, but it is not completely
general because it ignores the possibility that
the deposit insurance agency may have priority
over some investors. For the rest of the article,
however, I will restrict myself to purely deposit-
financed banks. This is at the opposite extreme
from the discussion in section I, and hence
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What is the face value of the debt, F ? With
no capital, if the bank funds n projects, each
requiring funds f, the face value is the sum of
the deposits, F =n.f . The payout of bank assets
is likewise the sum over the different projects, 
Yn =      ,
where n indexes the number of projects in
which the bank has invested. 
The Probability 
of Bank Failure
How likely is it that this bank will fail? The
answer is Pr(Sxi < F) or 
(2) Pr (Yn < n. f ). 
Assume that the xi’s are independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.), with mean
E(xi) = m; further assume that f < m, so 
that the face value of the debt is smaller than
the expected payout of the assets.
We can rewrite expression (2) as
(3)  Pr( < f )
because the set {y:y < n.f } is the same as the
set {y: < f }.
The weak law of large numbers (see Shirayev
[1984], theorem 2, p. 323; for a more elemen-
tary discussion, see Hogg and Craig [1978,
chapter 5]) tells us that provided E|xi|< ¥ and
Exi = m, then for all e > 0,
Pr{| – m|$ e} ® 0 as n ® ¥.
In particular, since f < m, Pr( < f )
< Pr(| – m|$ m – f ). That is, we can rep-
resent the values  below f as values that are
more than m – f away from the mean m. Thus,
as Diamond (1984) explicitly states, the weak
law of large numbers implies that diversifica-






As Samuelson points out, a rational utility max-
imizer maximizes expected utility, not the
probability of success. The probability of each
outcome must be weighted by the utility of that
outcome. As mentioned before, the failure of 
a $10 billion bank may cost the deposit insur-
ance agency more to resolve than that of a $10
million bank. 
In the simplest case of risk neutrality,
expected utility corresponds to expected value.
The first question, then, equivalent to assuming
risk neutrality on the agency’s part, concerns
the expected value of the deposit insurance
agency’s payout.3 Determining the expected
payout value becomes a question of finding the
expected value of a particular function. The
deposit insurance agency must pay 
0 if Y n   $ F,  that is, if $ f
(4)       and
F – Y n  if Y n   < f, that is, if  < f.
Figure 2 plots the function along with a typical
density function.
It is worth noting that the expected value of
(4) is not a conditional expectation. If the set 
A = {Y n: Y n  < F }, then the expected value of 
(4) is P(A) E(Y n|A) rather than E(Y n|A). A
simple example will make this clear. Take a
four-point distribution, P(1) = P(2) = P(3) = 
P(4) = 1
4 . Then E (X) = 1
4 (1 + 2 + 3 + 4) = 5
2.
Now define the function g(x) as g(x) = 
{0, if x $ 2.5, and x, if x < 2.5}. Then E [g(x)] 
= 1
4 (1 + 2) = 3























n 2 See also Winton (1997).
n 3 Although the calculation is not particularly difficult, I have not
seen it before in the literature.
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The question before us is what happens to
the expected value of the deposit insurance
agency’s payments as the bank diversifies.
Recall that the deposit insurance agency pays 
off if < f or, equivalently,  < f . By
the strong law of large numbers, the mean of 
the partial sums converges to a mass point 
on E(x); that is, the sample means approach
the true mean. Intuition suggests that the ex-
pected value of anything below the mean (and,
a fortiori, anything below f ) will have very lit-
tle importance, that is, an expected value
approaching zero. Put another way, as the
bank gets very large the probability gets vanish-
ingly small, and the average loan payoff falls
below the amount promised to depositors;
thus, the probability of a deposit insurer having
to make a payoff gets so low that the expected
value of that payoff approaches zero. 
To establish this rigorously and to under-
stand what diversification does to the expected
value of the deposit insurance agency’s pay-
ments requires a more formal approach, which
is provided in the appendix. The intuition and
results are lesscomplicated, however. As a
bank makes more loans, the expected value of
deposit insurance agency payouts tends toward
zero, and so the deposit insurance agency
would like to encourage large banks. Diversifi-




When risk aversion enters the picture, however,
a deposit insurer can be worse off with larger
banks. Strictly speaking, what Samuelson terms
the fallacy of large numbers enters only with
risk aversion. Applying it to an organization
such as a deposit insurance agency, rather than
to an individual, requires some justification.
One possibility is that a publicly sponsored
deposit insurance agency must obtain its funds
by taxing people, either indirectly through its
assessment on banks or directly by Congres-
sional appropriation. Risk aversion by the
deposit insurance agency may then reflect risk
aversion on the part of those taxed, or nonlin-
earities associated with distortionary taxation.
Alternatively, the risk aversion may result from
the incentives, constraints, and information fac-
ing the organization: The managers running it
may act risk averse, perhaps because their
future income depends on their performance.
(Of course, as Kane [1989] points out, this
dependency may sometimes promote risk-
seeking behavior, as in the FSLIC case.)
Conditions for 
the Fallacy 
Samuelson (1963) shows that if a consumer
rejects a bet at every wealth level, then he will
always reject any independent sequence of
those bets. Under the Samuelson condition, if
the deposit insurance agency found one bank
loan too risky, it would find a portfolio of any
number too risky. It would be no happier to
insure a large bank with many loans than a
small bank with few loans.
Samuelson posits a rather stringent condition.
It rules out, for example, constant relative risk-
averse (CRRA) utility, because CRRA exhibits
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), and
so some unacceptable gambles would become
acceptable at higher wealth levels. Pratt and
Zeckhauser (1987, p. 143) improve considerably
on the condition with their notion of proper risk
aversion. The conditions for proper risk aver-
sion answer the question, “An individual finds
each of two independent monetary lotteries un-
desirable. If he is required to take one, should
he not continue to find the other undesirable?”
In our problem, if the deposit insurer does not
like the risk in a bank with one loan, then it
will not like the risk in a bank with two loans.
Proper risk aversion shares one defect with
Samuelson’s condition, however: It is difficult to
characterize and difficult to determine whether a
particular utility function satisfies the condition.
A slightly stronger condition with a simple
characterization is proposed by Kimball (1993),
whose standard risk aversion implies proper
risk aversion. It thus applies a slightly stronger
condition than is strictly necessary for the fal-
lacy. If a utility function displays standard risk
aversion, then an investor who dislikes a bet
will also dislike a collection of such bets. 
Kimball (1993) shows that necessary and
sufficient conditions for standard risk aversion
are (monotone) DARA and (monotone) de-
creasing absolute prudence. If the utility func-
tion in question has a fourth derivative, then
these conditions (where, as before,W indicates
a person’s wealth) become
(5) (–  ) < 0 or u (3) > > 0
and
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A key point here is that the individual finds
each independent risk undesirable. (Kimball has
a slightly weaker, more technical condition that
he calls loss aggravation.) This certainly applies
to the problem as we have defined it, because
the payoff to the deposit insurance agency
is nonpositive—at best, it pays nothing. This is
not the only way to structure the problem, how-
ever, because the deposit insurance agency col-
lects premiums from banks. A major strand in
banking research has been to ascertain whether
the insurance premiums are fairly priced, that is,
whether they represent a tax or a subsidy on
the bank (Pennacchi [1987], Thomson [1987]).
The empirical results are mixed, varying by time
period and by bank; in any case, they assume
risk neutrality and so do not directly answer the
question most relevant here. It makes sense,
then, to think about both possibilities—the case
where the deposit insurance agency finds insur-
ing a single loan undesirable and the case
where it finds insuring a single loan desirable.
In the first case, where the deposit insurance
agency dislikes insuring an individual loan, ex-
pressions (5) and (6) provide sufficient condi-
tions for the agency to dislike insuring any port-
folio of such loans. That is, diversification by
adding risks does not work; adding risks makes
the insurance agency (guarantee corporation)
worse off. 
In the second case, where the deposit insur-
ance agency likes insuring an individual loan,
equations (5) and (6) do not help. Their deriva-
tion presupposes that the agency dislikes the
risk it bears. For favorable bets, Diamond (1984)
builds on Kihlstrom, Romer, and Williams
(1981) to develop sufficient conditions for when
the fallacy of large numbers is not a fallacy. 
Diamond poses the problem in terms of risk
premiums and notes that adding risks provides
true diversification if it reduces the risk pre-
mium. That is, diversification works if the incre-
mental premium for adding the second risky
loan to the portfolio is lower than for adding
the first (identical) risky loan. Kihlstrom, Romer,
and Williams show how to handle risk aversion
with two sources of uncertainty by defining a
new utility function, given initial wealth W0 and
initial risky bet x ~
1, as
(7) v(x2) = Eu(W0 + x ~
1 + x 2).
Now v(x2), as defined in equation (7), can be
treated as a utility function, so Diamond’s
question comes down to whether u(.) is more
risk averse than v(.). If it is, then the risk pre-
mium for bearing the second risk is lower than
for the first, and the fallacy of large numbers is
not a fallacy.
Diamond derives two sufficient conditions
under which u(.) will be more risk averse than
v(.) Using Jensen’s inequality, he shows that
(8) u(3) > 0
and
(9) u(4) > 0
are sufficient conditions when the risk has zero
expected value. When the risk is freely chosen,
he must append decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion, equation (5), to these conditions. The rea-
son is that a freely chosen gamble increases
mean wealth, which requires us to augment the
sufficient conditions.
Notice that inequalities (6) and (9) cannot
hold simultaneously because (6) demands a
negative fourth derivative and (9) demands a
positive fourth derivative. The inequalities apply
in different situations, however. Inequality (6)
concerns unfavorable bets and describes when
bearing one such risk makes the agent less will-
ing to bear another. Inequality (9) concerns
favorable bets and describes when bearing such
a risk makes the agent even more willing to
bear another. The conditions really answer two
quite different questions. Since each inequality
provides a sufficient but not necessary condi-
tion, any contradiction between the answers is
more apparent than real.
An important caveat is that this is consciously
a partial equilibrium analysis, concentrating on
the risk of a single bank. If that bank grows by
absorbing smaller ones, the total number of
loans insured by the system does not change. 
A bank merger does not change the total loans
insured by the agency, but merely redistributes
them. In a bank with many loans, the profitable
loans may offset the unprofitable, lessening the
guarantor’s liability. Since the deposit insurance
agency does not share in the positive profits, it
cannot undertake a similar offset if the loans are
in different banks. In an extreme case, if each
bank had only one loan, the insurer would
make payments on every nonperforming loan.
If all loans were in one bank, the insurer would
make payments only if the aggregate loan loss
were too large.
This is not the only scenario, however. The
bank may grow at the expense of nonbank
intermediaries or by making loans that would
not be made without the guarantee. Either case
results in an increase of total loans guaranteed
by the deposit insurance agency, increasing 
its liabilities as it takes on new loans that must
get insured.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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An Exponential
Example
A simple example can serve to illustrate some
of the subtleties involved. To show what can
happen, I use an exponential utility function
and an exponential distribution. The exponen-
tial distribution keeps the algebra simple be-
cause sums of exponentials are gamma distri-
butions.4  Exponential utility exhibits constant,
rather than decreasing, absolute risk aversion. 
It does not satisfy the sufficiency conditions of
Kimball ([5] and [6]) or of Diamond ([8] and [9]). 
Whether diversification helps or hurts de-
pends on the risk premium. If the risk pre-
mium decreases as the investor adds i.i.d.
risks, diversification helps. If the risk premium
increases, diversification hurts. The simplicity
of the example allows us to calculate the risk
premium explicitly.
Recall from equation (4) that, for one loan,
the deposit insurance agency pays nothing 
if the loan’s payoff exceeds its face value;
otherwise it pays the difference. Denoting this
function by g(x) (as in the appendix), the risk
premium is defined as the p1 that satisfies
(10) u{W0 – E [g(x ~)] – p1} = Eu[W0 – g(x ~)].
With x following the simplest exponential
distribution, e –x, the expected value in (10)
becomes
Eg(x ~) = ( f – 1) + e –f.
Using exponential utility of the form e –aW
allows us to solve for p1:





(e –f – e af )].
For two loans, g(x) is zero if x exceeds 2f
and 2f – x otherwise. The random variable x,
as the sum of two independent exponentials,
has a gamma distribution,
x ~   xe – x
=  x e – x .
G (2)      2
The expected value then becomes Eg(x ~) = 
2( f – 1) + 2( f + 1)e –2f. Solving for the risk
premium implicitly defined by u{W0 – E[g(x ~)]
– p2} = Eu[W0 – g(x ~)] using p2 = Eg(x) – 1
a
logEeag(x) yields 




1 + a2 e 2af
[1 – (1 + 2f(1 +a))e –(1 + a)f ] 
+ (1 + 2f )e  – 2f}.
To complete the example, set f, the face
value of the debt, to 1, and compute the pre-
mium for several values of risk aversion, evalu-
ating (11) and (12).
The example in table 1 illustrates that diver-
sification does not work in every case. The re-
quired risk premium for two loans is higher
than for only one: It even exceeds twice the
risk premium for one loan. As risk aversion
increases, the risk premiums also increase.
Although conditions (5) and (6) are not satis-
fied, the deposit insurance agency dislikes
adding more independent risks to its portfolio.
IV. Conclusion
Discussions of banking have been obscured by
a false analogy with portfolio theory. A bank
diversifies differently than does a mutual fund,
adding risks rather than subdividing them. Us-
ing the weak law of large numbers to establish
that diversified banks have a lower expected
failure rate neglects the deeper question of
whether this represents a decrease in economic
risk. To clearly pose that question is the main
point of this article.
Just because a bank is less likely to fail, it is
not necessarily less risky. If the insurer, or
owner, is risk neutral, a more complicated argu-
ment shows that the bank is less risky in the
sense of expected value. With risk aversion,
however, the question becomes ambiguous. As
a practical matter, sufficient conditions exist,
and the combination of exponential utility with
exponential distributions provides a tractable
framework for further exploration. 
Risk Face
aversion, a value p p1 p p2
0.1 1 0.006 0.018
1.0 1 0.066 0.193
10.0 1 0.392 0.979
SOURCE: Author.
T A B L E 1
Premium Computation
n 4 In general, bank loans are more likely to be negatively skewed,
while the exponential is positively skewed, so this example is not meant as
a realistic description of actual returns.
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Appendix
Let each random variable be defined on the
probability space (W, F, P) and identify W with
R, the real numbers, without loss of generality.
The random variables are then functions on this
space, Xi(v), and define Zn(v) as 
Zn(v)  =S .
Next, define the function g(v) as 
g(v) =    
f – X(v) if X(v) # f
and
0 if X(v) > f.
Note that we can think of the expectation 
E [X(v)] as a random variable, and so
g(E [X(v)] = g(m) = 0, since f < m. Further
define gn(v) as g[Zn(v)].
The value of diversification can then be
expressed by saying that as n approaches infin-
ity, the expected value of g(Zn) approaches
zero, or
(A1) lim Egn(v) = g(m) = 0. 
n ® ¥
To prove (A1), we use Lebesgue’s domi-
nated convergence theorem (Royden [1968], 
p. 229), which says that if h(v) $ 0 is integrable,
if |gn(v)| # h(v), and if gn(v) 
a.s.
® g(v), then
lim  Egn(v) = g(v). 
n ® ¥
The theorem first requires that we prove 
gn(v)
a.s.
® g (m). To do so, we use the strong law
of large numbers for i.i.d random variables (see
Breiman [1992, p. 52, theorem 3.30]), which
says that for i.i.d. X1, X2, X3 ..., if E|X1|< ¥
then 
a.s.
® E (X1), where 
a.s.
® denotes al-
most sure convergence, that is, convergence on
all but a set of measure (probability) zero. 
Hence, given an v, except for a set of meas-
ure zero, we have that for any e > 0, there 
exists an N such that if n > N,|Zn(v) –  m|< e.
Choose e , m –  f, which implies that if |Zn(v) –
m|< e , then Zn(v) > m – e  > f.  This, with the
definition of g, in turn implies that gn(v) = 0.
For this v, then, gn(v) = g(m) = 0, and, a fortiori,
|gn(v) – g(m)|, e. Since gn(v) ® g(m) for
each v where Zn ® m, the almost sure conver-




All that remains to be shown is the existence
of the integrable bound h(v). For this, use 
|Xi (v) + m – f |, which bounds gn and is inte-
grable because E|X1| , ¥ is a hypothesis of
the strong law. Hence, Lebesgue’s dominated
convergence theorem applies.
As a bank makes more loans, the expected
value of deposit insurance agency payouts
tends toward zero. Diversification works. 
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